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of the status of his possessions. However, in an in personam
action, no such additional factor being present, service by publication cannot be expected to reach the defendant. It would, therefore, seem likely that the Supreme Court would not react favorably
to a case where in personam jurisdiction is to be founded upon
notice by publication alone.
It may be possible, however, to justify service by publication
in actions arising from automobile accidents. In light of decisions
permitting service by publication alone in in rem actions, it may
well be asserted that where a party has been involved in an automobile accident requiring the exchange of license information,
such as in, Gibbs, Polansky, Sellars and Dobkin, he shall be
presumed to have constructive notice of the possibility of some
judicial action in the near future. The onus, therefore, should be
upon him to permit the other party to maintain contact with him.
This result may be accomplished by requiring him to provide
a forwarding address upon moving from the address given at the
scene of the accident. When he has failed to do so, service
could then be effected by publication.
In a case where a plaintiff obtains a default judgment on a
cause of action arising from an automobile accident due to the
defendant's lack of actual notice, the defendant's rights are protected by CPLR 317 which permits him to open the default and
defend on the merits. However burdensome this procedure may be
to a defendant, it would appear that a greater injustice arises
when a plaintiff is precluded from all legal recourse due to the
defendant's moving to an unknown address thereby making
personal or constructive service upon him impossible.
ARTICLE

10-

PARTIES GENERALLY

CPLR 1007: Legal expenses not allowed.
Frank Angelilli Constr. Co. v. Sullivan & Son, Inc. 26 involved
an action by a customer against its supplier for breach of warranty
of merchantability in which the supplier impleaded the manufacturer under CPLR 1007. As part of the indemnification, the
supplier sought legal expenses.
Generally, in the absence of statutory or contractual liability,
legal expenses in litigating a cause of action are not recoverable. 27
However, there is some New York precedent allowing their
2652 Misc. 2d 306, 276 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1966).
27 Edelman v. Goodman, 47 Misc. 2d 8, 261 NY.S.2d 618 (Sup. Ct. Kings

County 1965).
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recovery where they were incurred by the plaintiff in defending
a prior action necessitated by the wrongful act of the defendant. 2
The issue becomes somewhat more unclear when, instead of suing
for legal expenses previously incurred in a subsequent litigation,
the defendant impleads his indemnitor. However, the court in
the instant case did not feel compelled to decide this question,
since the jury concluded that the manufacturer was not guilty
of any wrongful act.
ARTICLE

30 -

RE

EDIES AND PLEADING

Punitive Damages: Available where there is gross negligence.
Although negligence cases dealing squarely with punitive
damages are few, there is dictum that such damages are re29
coverable in instances of gross negligence or reckless conduct.
Some negligence cases have conceded the propriety of punitive
damages while disallowing their actual award on collateral
grounds.30 Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co.,3 often cited
for the proposition that gross negligence justifies punitive damages,
held that the facts there did not indicate such a degree of
negligence.
In all of these cases, the soundness of imposing
punitive damages has never been the critical issue. The Caldwell
court avoided an unequivocal endorsement of such an imposition
by relying on the failure to meet the vague standard of "gross
32
negligence." The recent decision in Soucy v. Greyhound Corp.,
apparently the first reported case so holding, foreclosed that
avenue of retreat by holding that the plaintiff's allegations of
fact, 33 if proven, would meet the standard of gross negligence
28 Madison County Constr. Co. v. State, 177 Misc. 777, 31 N.Y.S2d 883

(Ct. CI. 1941).
29 Voltz v. Blackmar, 64 N.Y. 440, 444 (1876)

(assault and battery);

Noonan v. Luther, 119 App. Div. 701, 703, 104 N.Y. Supp. 684, 686

(3d

Dep't 1907) (assault and battery); DeMarrasse v. Wolf, 140 N.Y.S.2d 235,
238 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1955) (malicious prosecution); Darr v. Cohen,
94 Misc. 471, 478, 158 N.Y. Supp. 324, 328 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1916)
(nuisance abatement). See generally 14 N.Y. JuR. Dauages § 181 (1960).

30 Powers v. Manhattan Ry., 120 N.Y. 178, 24 N.E. 295 (1890) (jury
not apprised of necessity of finding gross negligence); Cleghorn v. New
York Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 56 N.Y. 44 (1874) (jury not apprised
of necessity of finding gross negligence); Millard v. Brown, 35 N.Y. 297
(1866) (defendant prevented from proving facts tending to show his negli-

gence was not gross).
3147 N.Y. 282 (1872).
3227 App. Div. 2d 112, 276 N.Y.S.2d 173 (3d Dep't 1967) (motion to
amend complaint to ask for punitive damages).
33 Plaintiff was injured when bus in which she was riding left the road
and rolled over. It was alleged that the bus was old, was equipped with

